This article analyses the impact of the
Policy Challenges for Australia original product and there is a strong chance they would say no.
The perception that generic pharmaceuticals are not as good as the original product is not uncommon, even among some doctors and pharmacists. Their logic might be to suspect the quality of generics: if a drug is cheaper then it cannot be as good. Doctors may therefore feel hesitant about prescribing generics and prefer to stick with what they know. If information on generic equivalents is limited, many doctors may choose to prescribe the big-name brand, or originator product, believing it to be a better option for their patients. But while there may sometimes be good reason behind doctors prescribing certain brands -their patients could be allergic or sensitive to the excipients (that is, the inactive ingredients) in the alternatives, such as a colouring agent, lactose or gluten -more often there is no justification for believing so.
Pharmaceutical companies are well aware of the commercial advantages inherent in the public perception that better-known is best. Take these comments from a major pharmaceutical company spokesman, for example:
It is not uncommon for generic and originator medicines to have different pharmacokinetics. Pharmacokinetics describes the absorption, distribution, metabolism and elimination of the drug from the body. This can mean possible clinical differences between use of originator and generic medicines. The effects of changing from an originator to a generic (or vice-versa) would ultimately depend upon different patient circumstances and would always be at the discretion of a patient' s physician. (Excerpt of an email received from a representative at Novartis Pharmaceuticals in November 2002, in response to an inquiry about two of their post-patent products and identical alternatives. Subsequent unattributed quotations are from personal communications and/or interviews.)
The use of consumer-unfriendly terminology such as 'pharmacokinetics', coupled with the catch-all qualification that it is up to the doctor' s discretion, would be sufficient to deter many patients from using the generic.
The mere fact that the Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA) deems a generic product to be bio-equivalent or therapeutically equivalent to the originator does not seem to be enough to convince all doctors and pharmacists to suggest patients take alternative brands.
There is no doubt that brand loyalty and bigdollar promotions play a part in maintaining an originator' s post-patent drug market share, but the public perception of generic drugs as being the lesser product has to be a major contributing factor. Health is something most people do not economise on, and if we are sick we are inclined to do whatever it takes to get better. This extends to purchasing medicine. People often prefer to rely on the 'tried and tested' brands that they know will make them better rather than take a brand they do not know.
According to the federal Health Department, generics accounted for 18% of total PBS prescriptions for the 2002-03 financial year. The generics industry itself says its share of the market is more than this. According to the executive director of the Generic Medicines Industry Association, Di Ford, generics account for 23% of prescriptions, by volume, and 12% in terms of value. Whichever figures are right, the use of generics in Australia is low compared with the United Kingdom, where generics account for about 50% of prescriptions, and to the United States and Canada, where generics make up between 40% and 45% of the market.
Australia' s relatively low use of generics is explained partly by historically small price differentials between brand and generic products (Lofgren 2004 ). An important factor is also that Australian doctors do not generally prescribe drugs 'generically' (by their scientific name -as in the UK) but by the brand name. Also, Australia' s predominant bulk purchaser, the federal government through the PBS, has not as yet sought to systematically give preference to the cheapest generic alternatives 
Generics as cross-licensed 'fighting brands'
Pharmaceutical suppliers have been able to charge brand price premiums since December 1990, provided at least one brand is at the benchmark price. As well as allowing pharmaceutical companies greater flexibility in the pricing of their products, the brand premium policy, according to the Pharmaceutical Benefits Pricing Authority, . . . has the effect of making it possible for prescribers and patients to be more aware of the price of drugs. The policy also allows companies to establish prices taking into account competition and the heightened consumer awareness of price differentials. (PBPA 2003, p. 6) Put simply, brand price premiums are meant to make consumers aware of how much they pay for their medicines, as well as encourage the development of the generic pharmaceutical industry in Australia. More than a decade after the introduction of this policy, its effectiveness on these two fronts is still debatable.
As of May 2003 there were 303 products with a brand price premium, ranging from 6 cents to $79.48. (Blenoxane, Bristol-Myers Squibb' s brand of bleomycin sulfate, used for lymphoma, is the PBS item with the $79.48 brand price premium). There were 32.6 million prescriptions dispensed in the 12 months to May 2003 with the weighted average brand premium being $1.57. This means Australians paid $51.2 million to stick with the big name brands when generic alternatives were available. For the same period, there were 943 products at the benchmark price, for which there were 37.8 million prescriptions (PBPA 2003) . Where consumers had the choice between buying a brand at the benchmark price or a higher priced brand, in 46% of cases consumers decided to do the latter. If price alone were the major factor in the purchasing of pharmaceuticals, brands at benchmark prices (including generics) would surely have a much higher percentage of the market. The fact that this is not the case seems counter-intuitive, but it goes to show how differently consumers behave when it comes to purchasing pharmaceuticals, compared with other retailed products.
Fervent believers in generic pharmaceuticals would no doubt maintain that paying brand price premiums is a waste of money. They would be dismayed to learn that just 10 drugs, for which there are identical, cheaper, alternatives, account for almost 30% of the total brand price premium collected every year.
"This is not the business of any newspaper"
In late 2002 I was working as a federal politics reporter for the Herald Sun newspaper in the Press Gallery of Parliament House in Canberra. The health portfolio was a particular focus for me, and I took special interest in the PBS. In October 2002, I received an anonymous fax that named about 20 well-known drug brands and their 'cross-licensed alternatives'. Not knowing what a cross-licensed alternative was, I made a few calls. A contact told me the cross-licensed products were identical to the big-name drugs listed in the fax (which included Ventolin, Prozac, Zovirax and Losec) but were cheaper. The contact described these repackaged identical alternatives as 'pseudo-generics', saying they only existed to fight the true generics and, in some cases, to delay the entry of competitors into the market. Further investigations (and another anonymously supplied document) suggested there were more than 70 items on the PBS that had 'fighting brands' or pseudo-generics. While in some cases there were no differences in price between originator and pseudo-generic, the majority of originators had brand price premiums. This was the category of greatest interest. The suppliers of these 70-plus originator products were asked the following questions: 1 While Fugerel is still listed on the PBS it has been discontinued in favour of promotion of Eulexin.
2 Noroxin has a brand premium of $3.73 and Insensye's brand premium is $ Secret commercial-in-confidence agreements between the originator drug company and the company that sells a cross-licensed product prevent consumers, doctors and pharmacists knowing that some of the products marketed and sold as generic versions of the well-known brands are actually identical to the more expensive brand. Many doctors and pharmacists may know pseudo-generics exist, but we cannot be sure they know the extent of the cross-licensing arrangements. Consumers are even more in the dark.
The only clue to a cross-licensing deal is usually on the packaging, and is a matter of the consumer inferring a connection rather than the manufacturer declaring a connection. For example, Acimax, the identical Alphapharm alternative to AstraZeneca' s Losec, notes on its box that 'Acimax' is a registered trademark of AstraZeneca Pty Ltd and that Acimax is supplied by AstraZeneca for Alphapharm.
It is not an easy matter for a consumer to find out whether a generic product is identical to the medication they take. A case in point: when the TGA was asked to explain the difference between Roche' s product Valium and Sauter Industries' Ducene, this was the answer I received: "The Therapeutic Goods Administration would not normally reveal information such as the manufacturer of particular products as this would be considered to be 'commercial-in-confidence'." The TGA pointed out there were three alternative brands to Valium, of which Ducene was one.
Roche has six PBS-listed drugs that have identical alternatives: Anaprox 550 (Crysanal); Aurorix (Mohexal and Arima); Naprosyn SR (Proxen SR); Rivotril (Paxam); Roaccutane (Isohexal and Accure); and Valium (Ducene). Roche' s anti-acne drug Roaccutane (isotretinoin), which has a brand price premium of $2.50, is an interesting example. Hexal Australia repackages Roche' s product and sells it as Isohexal, while Alphapharm does the same and calls it Accure. The inherent cynicism of this business approach is no better displayed than in the photographs of the three branded drugs provided for the MIMS product identification guide. The photos of the 10 mg pills of each of the three brands are identical: ie, each photo shows the same image. AstraZeneca has three PBS-listed drugs with identical alternatives: Losec (Acimax); Plendil (Agon and Felodur); and Zestril (Lisodur). This company argues that introduction of a fighting brand is a legitimate way of protecting its market share after the expiry of patents. Jeays Lilley, the managing director of AstraZeneca (Australia), said cross-licensed products can help stave off the impact of cheaper generics:
It' s fundamental marketing to want to protect your share of the market that you've established over a long time through significant investment in R&D. I don't think it' s a cynical approach to life. I think the facts of life are that the profits post-patent are substantially reduced.
Mr Lilley added: "The originator companies build the markets for these brands and the generic alternative is really just sold on the basis of alternative availability. Generic companies don't create markets, they feed off them."
Given that Mr Lilley sees generics as parasitic, it is no surprise that AstraZeneca' s desire to protect its products from 'predation' is perhaps fiercest for its peptic ulcer/reflux drug omeprazole, which is the third-highest Government-cost drug on the PBS ($179.6 million in 2003). AstraZeneca' s originator product Losec, for which there were 1.915 million scripts in the 12 months to March 2004, is the single biggest earner in brand price premiums of all items on the PBS (Box 2). This is despite that fact that Acimax -the identical alternative sold by Alphapharm under a crosslicensing deal with AstraZeneca -now secures more than half of total scripts for omeprazole (50.1% of total scripts for the 12 months to March 2004 -Box 3). With Losec commanding a $1.50 brand price premium, patients paid an extra $2.9 million on top of the PBS co-payment. This is profit generated by the power of branding and pharmaceutical fame, rather than from any health benefit. Put another way, concession cardholders who pay $4.60 for PBS scripts (from January 1, 2005) pay an extra 33% if they choose, or are prescribed, Losec over Acimax. Losec' s share of the omeprazole market (49.9%) is on the decline (it was 72.4% in the 12 months to June 30, 2002), but by retaining just under half of the market share with its original product, AstraZeneca looks well placed to continue reaping big premiums on Losec in years to come. It is important to note, however, that other than Losec and Acimax there are no other brands of omeprazole. From a purely manufacturing point of view, AstraZeneca has a monopoly on omeprazole. But to counter Losec' s decline, AstraZeneca has poised to step up promotion of another reflux drug, esomeprazole, which is an isomer variant of omeprazole. Importantly for AstraZeneca, esomeprazole (sold as Nexium) is still under patent and therefore has no competition, pseudo-generic or otherwise. Total scripts for esomeprazole in 2003 were 1.62 million (39.4% of total scripts for omeprazole). Government subsidy of esomeprazole scripts in 2003 cost $81 million, making it the eleventh costliest drug under the PBS.
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) is another pharmaceutical giant whose cross-marketed products make it many millions of dollars. GSK has two brands in the list of 10 top earners in brand price premium: Ventolin and Zantac. Ventolin (salbutamol sulfate) has a product familiarity that stretches well beyond its asthmatic target group. In commercial terms, Ventolin' s familiarity and fame translate to a golden opportunity for charging a brand price premium. Ventolin CFC-free puffers attract a $1 premium over the identical product it sells to Alphapharm (sold as Asmol CFC-free puffer). Between the two, 2.05 million CFC-free asthma puffers were sold in the 12 months to March 2004, but GSK' s Ventolinbranded version secured 67.6% of the market. Asmol accounted for 30% of the asthma puffer market, with other products picking up 2.4%. It is a similar story with salbutamol nebulisers. Ventolin Nebules, which carry a $2.20 brand price premium, were 54.7% of the PBS scripts in salbutamol nebulisers, with the identical Asmol uni-dose nebulisers on 36.8% and others on 8.5%. All up, GSK' s originator branded products in salbutamol sulfate commanded 64.3% of the market in the year to March 2004, earning it $2.28 million in brand price premium for the period. This makes it the second biggest earner in premiums, behind Losec. Importantly for GSK, if Alphapharm' s Asmol-branded puffers and nebulisers are excluded, the real competition (that is, true generics) is located in and arises from only 4% of the market. Of the top 10 earners in brand price premiums, the generics' share of the market is highest for the ACE inhibitor enalapril, where the generic brands are 51.6%, compared with 43.4% for Merck Sharp & Dohme' s originator product Renitec and 5.1% for the identical alternative Amprace, which is sold by Amrad Pharmaceuticals. Merck' s spokeswoman Virginia Nicholls confirmed Amprace was not a generic but: Ms Nicholls said Merck believed generics had a 'valid' role to play in the market once patents had expired and also pointed out that no generic manufacturer had yet committed itself to bringing a new medicine to market:
It is important to recognise that only three in 10 medicines produce sales that match or exceed the average $A750 million plus R&D costs. These medicines must carry the cost of the products that fail in the clinical trials and never make it to market. Amrad is actually a very good example of this: despite the revenue from Amprace and other licensed medicines, a couple of promising therapies that fell down at stage 2 trials were immensely expensive and damaging for the Melbourne biotech, and it' s still recovering.
In the Schedule of Pharmaceutical Benefits booklet issued to doctors and pharmacists, Amrad Pharmaceuticals (manufacturer' s code AD) has the same South Granville (New South Wales) address and telephone number as Merck. On face value, this appears similar to the cross-licensing deals struck by Aventis Pharma over Cardizem and Rulide, both of which have identical alternatives sold by Hoechst, a division of Aventis Pharma. It is also similar to the cross-licensing deals that relate to seven brands of contraceptive pills: Pharmacia' s Brevinor, Brevinor-1 and Synphasic are up against pseudo-generics sold by Kenral (a division of Pharmacia that shares its address and telephone number); Wyeth Pharmaceuticals' Nordette 28 and Triphasil 28 sit alongside identical alternatives sold by Wyeth Australia; and Schering' s Microgynon 30 ED and Triquilar ED compete with pseudo-generics sold by its parent company Schering AG (again, same contact details for both).
Premiums on these seven brands of oral contraceptive pill remain a big earner for Wyeth, Schering and Pharmacia, even though the identical alternatives now well and truly outsell the originators. This is because their brand price premiums are in the higher range, starting at $7.96 a script and going as high as $9.88 (as of May 2004). In the 12 months to March 2004, these contraceptives earned their companies a total of $864 111 in premiums, despite being only 12.6% of the 815 079 scripts for the drugs. The overall use of these seven contraceptives -originator or cross-licensed product -is on the decline: in the year to June 30, 2002, there were just under 906 000 scripts for the drugs, of which 18% were for the originator drug. The total of premiums paid for that period was $1.4 million.
Analysis of the prescription patterns for the top 10 earners in brand price premiums shows how successful cross-licensing deals can be in limiting the influence of generics. Of the top 10 originators, three do not have any generic competition at all, other than the pseudo-generics (Losec, Rulide and The Pill) and of the other seven, four have kept the generics' share of the market at 7% or less (Ventolin, Cardizem, Plendil and Isoptin). All up, generic competitors with the top 10 biggest earners in brand price premiums secured just 9.5% of the market, with 1.49 million of the 15.6 million scripts in the 12 months to March 2004. The originators accounted for 7.23 million of the scripts (46.3%) and pseudo-generics were on 6.89 million scripts (44.1%).
Policy Challenges for Australia
Brand price premiums are not the consumer' s friend. This is not only because they mean patients pay more for originator medicines when an identical alternative exists, but also because brand price premiums go hand-in-hand with cross-licensing deals that are used by pharmaceutical companies to minimise competition from generics. By installing a pseudo-generic by means of a cross-licensing deal, companies can make it financially unattractive for generic companies to move in on the market with their own version of the drug compound. In such cases, brand price premiums effectively become a way for pharmaceutical companies to offset profit losses that arise from the striking of cross-licensing arrangements for the pseudo-generic.
The market entry of fighting brands sees the taxpayer subsidy of post-patent PBS items fall. On the face of it, this satisfies the Federal Government' s desire to keep costs down. But when fighting brands are established alongside brand price premiums for the originator, an end result could be the delayed entry of generic competition, especially where brand price premiums are being used to offset losses following patent expiry. Given that drug prices fall according to the amount of competition, the onus lies with the Government to create the right environment for generic competition. This is perhaps even more important when the only 'competition' is a pseudo-generic. Simvastatin' s patent expiry in Australia will affect the prices of other statins listed on the PBS, including Lipitor and Pravachol (Bristol-Myers Squibb' s brand for pravastatin, the sixth-highest Government cost drug on the PBS, at $108.5 million in 2003), even though their patents are yet to expire. This is because they are within the same reference group, meaning that their prices are referenced to the cheapest product within the particular therapeutic class of medicine. The chief executive of Alphapharm, John Montgomery, told the Australian Financial Review that he expected the prices of statins to fall by 30% after June 2005 (Mellish 2004). The newspaper estimated this would be a saving to Government of about $250 million a year.
The patent expiry of statins will provide an excellent opportunity for the Health Department to review its brand premium policy. Brand premiums are likely on the originators' products and, given Policy Challenges for Australia the interest of generics manufacturers overseas in the statin market, the real test will be whether the cross-licensing deals will stave off generic alternatives. For the government and the consumer, this would be bad news.
It is ironic that producers of originator pharmaceuticals are quick to question the quality of generic alternatives when they may themselves be the suppliers of competing products. Brand price premiums, while good for the pharmaceutical industry' s bottom line, discourage confidence in generic products deemed interchangeable, by inadvertently promoting the perception that they are second-rate derivatives of the originator product. And while brand price premiums do not hurt Australia' s biggest purchaser of pharmaceuticalsthe federal government -they do eat into consumers' budgets, often for no more benefit than peace of mind and confidence in the familiar.
The brand premium policy -as it stands now -allows manufacturers to list a pseudo-generic at the current price and place a premium on the originator, even if it is still under patent. This does not result in any savings to Government, and lumbers patients with extra costs.
So what are the alternatives?
Mandating price reductions upon the introduction of an alternative brand is one option. By stipulating that alternative brands must be priced at a certain percentage below the originator or benchmark price, savings would flow to both the consumer and to the government, regardless of whether the alternative brand is a pseudo-generic or a generic. This approach would also work when the originator product is still under patent. Helpful to the development of policy would be to know how often doctors tick the 'do not substitute' box on their patients' scripts. Surprisingly, the Health Insurance Commission does not keep such data, even though it would shed much light on medical professionals' level of brand loyalty. A spokesman for the Health Insurance Commission, however, said that such information was considered a privileged communication between the doctor and the pharmacist: "We have no means of collecting or capturing that information: that is a policy set by the Health Department." This policy needs revisiting.
Government embrace of the 'medicines not brands' way of thinking could take many forms. Generic prescribing -that is, the prescription of drugs by their chemical compound -would be the most obvious way of countering the brand culture. More controversial would be the introduction of practice incentive payments for doctors and pharmacists who prescribe or recommend generics. Without policy change, Australia will continue to see emphasis on big-name pharmaceuticals, resulting in market and consumer manipulation and the suppression of true competition.
